Week 2~120 minLesson 2 of 4

Threat Modelling in Practice

Applying STRIDE to wallet software and choosing custody models that match real threat profiles.

01Objectives
  • 01Apply STRIDE to a wallet software stack and identify realistic threats
  • 02Compare hot, warm, and cold custody trade-offs for different risk profiles
  • 03Assess device posture and identify OS-level attack surfaces
  • 04Produce a one-page threat model for a small-team treasury
01

STRIDE Applied to Wallet Software

STRIDE — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege — is a threat-modelling framework originally developed at Microsoft. Applied to a wallet, it surfaces threats that pure crypto analysis misses.

Spoofing: a phishing site impersonates your wallet provider's UI. Tampering: malware modifies the transaction you are about to sign, changing the recipient address after you have verified it on screen but before it reaches the signing device. Information Disclosure: clipboard managers or screen-share software expose your mnemonic during backup. Each category produces a concrete, testable threat you can mitigate.

The output of a STRIDE exercise is a table: threat → asset at risk → likelihood → impact → mitigation. This table becomes your operational security checklist.

02

Hot vs. Warm vs. Cold Custody Trade-Offs

Hot wallets (browser extensions, mobile apps) keep the private key on a network-connected device. They are convenient but sit in the richest attack environment. Warm wallets add a layer — a hardware wallet that must physically approve each transaction, but is connected to a computer during signing. Cold wallets keep the signing device fully air-gapped; transactions are transported via QR code or SD card.

The trade-off is always speed-of-access vs. attack surface. A trading desk needs hot wallets for sub-second execution. A corporate treasury holding reserves should never need hot access. The mistake most teams make is using the same custody model for operating funds and reserves.

03

Device Posture & OS Hardening

The device running your wallet is part of the trust boundary. A compromised OS can keylog your password, swap clipboard addresses, or extract keys from memory. Hardening means: keep the OS updated, use full-disk encryption, disable browser extensions on the wallet machine, and — ideally — dedicate a device exclusively to signing.

For teams, device posture assessment should be part of onboarding: is the laptop encrypted? Is the browser profile clean? Is the wallet software downloaded from the official source and checksum-verified? These are not exotic controls; they are baseline hygiene that prevents the most common losses.

02Exercises
  1. 01Pick a wallet you currently use. Build a STRIDE table with at least two threats per category. Identify the top three mitigations you would implement first.
  2. 02Design a custody architecture for a 5-person startup holding €200k in ETH. Specify hot, warm, and cold tiers with dollar thresholds and signing policies.
  3. 03Audit your own primary device's posture: OS version, disk encryption, browser extensions, installed wallet software. Write a one-paragraph assessment.
03Key takeaways
  • STRIDE surfaces threats that pure cryptography analysis misses
  • Custody tier (hot/warm/cold) should match the access-frequency and risk profile of the funds
  • Device posture is part of the trust boundary — a compromised OS defeats any wallet
  • A written threat model is a living document, not a one-time exercise
04Resources